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Law and HumanBehavior, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1991

Social Science and the Courts
The Role of Amicus Curiae Briefs*
Ronald Roesch,t Stephen L. Golding,:
Valerie P. Hans,? and N. Dickon Reppucci?

Social scientists have increasinglybecome involved in the submissionof amicus curiae or "friendof
the court" briefs in legal cases being decided by state and federalcourts. This increasehas triggered
considerabledebate about the use of briefs to communicaterelevant social science research. This
article evaluates the strengthsand weaknesses of various methods of summarizingsocial science
researchfor the courts. It also reviews the proceduresfor submittingbriefsdevelopedby the American
Psychology-Law Society which, in collaborationwith the AmericanPsychologicalAssociation, has
submittedits first brief in Marylandv. Craig, a case recently decided by the U.S. SupremeCourt.

Social scientists have become increasinglyinvolved in the submission of amicus
curiae or "friendof the court" briefs to the courts (Acker, 1990;Tremper, 1987).
Such briefs summarize research relevant to a particularlegal case, describing
implicationsfor legal issues before a court. Social science briefs have been submittedin a numberof recent cases, includingthose on the death penalty (Lockhart
v. McCree, 1986;Bersoff, 1987),gay rights(Watkinsv. United States Army, 1988;
Melton, 1989), abortion (Thornburghv. American College of Physician and Surgeons, 1986;InterdivisionalCommitteeon Adolescent Abortion, 1987),jury size
(Ballew v. Georgia, 1978; Tanke & Tanke, 1979), prediction of dangerousness
* Requestsfor reprintsand other correspondenceshouldbe sent to RonaldRoesch, 936 Peace Portal
Drive, P.O. Box 8014-153,Blaine, Washington,98230. The authors wish to thank James Ogloff,
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t Simon Fraser University.
t University of Utah.
? Universityof Delaware.
? University of Virginia.
1
0147-7307/91/0200-0001$06.50/0 ? 1991 Plenum Publishing Corporation

2

ROESCHET AL.

(Barefoot v. Estelle, 1983), and rights of mentally ill individuals (City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 1985; Melton & Garrison, 1987).

This issue of Law and Human Behavior provides an opportunityto discuss
and debate the participationof social scientists in amicus briefs. A year ago, the
AmericanPsychology-Law Society (AP-LS) initiateda pro bono brief project in
which it collaborateswith the AmericanPsychologicalAssociation (APA) in preparingbriefs. The first such brief was filed in Marylandv. Craig (1990), a U.S.
SupremeCourtcase involvingcourtroomtestimony of child witnesses. Introducing a new feature of Law and Human Behavior, we are pleased to publish this
brief in its entirety, along with commentaryon the Court's decision (Goodman,
Levine, Melton, & Ogden, 1991). This issue of the journal also includes an AdversaryForum in which Rogers Elliott and Phoebe Ellsworth debate the role of
social science briefs in the context of death penalty cases.
The participationof social scientists in amicus briefs has raised numerous
importantand complex issues in the scholarly community. There has been a
long-standingdebate about the appropriaterole for social scientists with respect
to public policy (see Reppucci, 1985).Should social scientists limit themselves to
conducting and publishingtheir research and leave it to others to apply their
research findings?Or do they have an ethical obligationto assist the courts and
other social groups in matters relatingto their expertise? If an activist role for
social scientists is appropriate,what are the comparative advantages of brief
writing, expert testimony, and other mechanismsof approachingthe courts?
By publishingthe Craig brief and the articles in this issue, we hope to facilitate open scholarlydiscussion about the briefprocess. We invite commentsfrom
readerson any aspect of this process, from the generalproprietyof amicus briefs
to specific conclusions and inferencesdrawnfrom any particularbrief. The editor
will review comments, but expects that, space permitting,all of them will be
published so that a range of opinion and discussion is aired. We hope that publicationof these briefs and commentaryencouragessubstantivedebate about how
the research findings of our field are best communicatedto the courts.
Social Science Impact on the Legal System
Social science researchmightinfluencecourt decisions in a numberof ways.
At one end of the continuum,researcherstake no active role in directly communicating their research results to the judiciary-research findings are published,
usually in scientificjournals, and may find their way into legal decisions if judges
cite them as secondary sources for their opinions. Ellsworth and Getman (1986)
arguethat the greatestimpactof social science findingsmay occur when research
findings are so widely disseminatedand accepted in the communityat large that
judges consider them to be truisms. At the other end of the continuum,research
is brought directly to the attention of the courts in formal briefs preparedfor
particularcases. Obviously, this requiresmore active and direct participationby
individualsand organizations.
Althoughit has been arguedthat there is a growinginfluenceof social science
in law (Levine & Howe, 1985),measuringthe impactof social science researchis
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a particularlydifficult problem. Impact studies rely primarilyon citation counts
for an indicationof whether the courts have used such research in their opinions.
Counts of social science articles cited in legal decisions may possibly underrepresent the influence of researchbecause judges may be reluctantto cite empirical
research even when it influenced their opinions (Tremper, 1987). Further, as
Hafemeisterand Melton (1987)point out, "Citationsmay be mere makeweightor
post hoc rationalizationsfor views originatingfrom other, unexpressed sources"
(p. 33). It may also be thatjudges cite or rely on a brief when the brief supports
their position and ignore it when it does not.
Given their legal training,judges are, of course, more inclined to cite legal
precedent in their opinions. In a study of the Supreme Court's use of social
science research in children's cases, Hafemeister and Melton (1987) found that
judges most often cite priorlegal opinions to substantiatean opinion, a conclusion
also reached in similar citation studies (e.g., Tremper, 1987). When secondary
social science sources were cited, they were typically ones published in legal
periodicals or government reports. Hafemeister and Melton conclude that researcherswho want theirresults to reach the courts shouldpublishin law reviews,
participatein governmentand organizationaltask forces, and contributeto stateof-the-artreviews and briefs by professionalorganizations.
It may also be thatjudges do not rely on social science research because of
the substantial differences in the disciplines of law and social science. Haney
(1980)contrasts the two disciplines and points to differencesin "styles and methods of reasoning, proof, and justification used in psychology and law" (p. 158).
Because judges are trainedin the law and are generally unfamiliarwith psychology's researchmethodologyand statistics, they are naturallymore inclinedto rely
on legal scholarshipand precedent when they make their decisions. The differences in trainingand approachesto scholarshipmake communicationbetween the
two disciplines difficult. However, the increase in the numberof social scientists
with degrees in both law and psychology (Roesch, Grisso, & Poythress, 1985;
Tomkins& Ogloff, 1990),the introductionof social science courses in law schools
(Monahan& Walker;see review by Slobogin, 1991), and the hiringof psychologists in law schools (Melton, Monahan,& Saks, 1987)may lessen the gap.

The Use of ExpertTestimony
Some argue that expert testimony in the court may be the best way to introduce social science evidence because it allows the court to determinethe direct
relevancy of the testimony, it allows experts to educate triers of fact with respect
to complex scientific debates and literature,and it allows the court to evaluate the
evidence subject to cross-examination(see Tremper, 1987, for a review). At the
same time, the use of adversaryexperts to convey scientific findings presents a
numberof problems (e.g., Chesler, Sanders, & Kalmuss, 1988; Fienberg, 1989;
McCloskey, Egeth, & McKenna, 1986; Saks, 1990; Vidmar & Schuller, 1989).
Among other things, scholars question the ability of individual scientists to
present accurate and unbiased summaries of the scientific literature under the
pressures of an adversary system that encourages partisanpresentations of re-
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search literature(Saks, 1990). Critics also express doubts about the ability of
judges (see Fienberg, 1989)andjuries (see Vidmar& Schuller, 1989)to interpret
and weigh scientific evidence presentedby individualexperts withinan adversarial format. The advocacy role played by many expert witnesses may also have
weakened the value of such testimony (andbriefs as well) in the eyes of the court
(see Bazelon, 1982).Undoubtedly,courtroombattles of the experts have reduced
the credibilityof psychologicalresearchin the eyes of manyjudges as well as the
public. When experts disagree, the courts may decide that the best course is to
simply ignore their testimony. These problems with expert testimony may be
mitigatedin several ways. First, the courts could use their authorityto appointa
panel of experts. Second, the increasingprevalence of social science courses in
law school curriculashould have the effect of increasingsocial science sophistication in the legal community. Finally, the disseminationof specialty guidelines
such as those developed by AP-LS (Golding,Grisso, Shapiro,& Weissman, 1990)
may increase the rigor of cross-examinationand the quality of the testimony
offered to the courts.
The Use of Briefs
Briefs can supplementor take the place of expert witnesses as a methodfor
communicatinga body of research findings to the courts. This is perhaps more
true with appellatecourts since trial courts make limited use of briefs, traditionally relying on expert testimony. Briefs may have an advantageover expert testimony because they are usually preparedby several individuals, they are reviewed by official groups or organizations,1and their sources are documented.
Also, briefwritersare not paidfor theirwork, unlikeexperts who are hiredby one
side or the other to testify in court. Consequently, the courts may have more
confidence that the brief representsthe field as a whole.
Briefs drawconclusions from a body of researchstudies with conditionsthat
vary by time, place, experimenter,sample, experimentalmanipulation,and other
variables. When these multiple experiments produce results consistent with a
particularinference, convergent validity can be established, as Ellsworth (1991)
points out in her article in this issue of Law and HumanBehavior. Problemscan
arise when the results of multipleexperimentersare divergentor when the inferences to be made are not clear-cut. In this case, the brief writers' task is more
difficult, and the resultingbrief may be more controversial.2
As is the case in most scientific inquiries,the methodologyused in a particular study, the analysis of the data, and the conclusions and inferencesdrawnare

2

Criticsmightarguethatin realitythereis little review becauseof time constraints,so it is not always
possible to get broadinput.
Indeed, some scholars reject the possibility that social science research has much to offer. For
example, Gergen(1982)takes a dim view of the amountof knowledgegeneratedby social science.
He arguesthat social science has no clear and dependableproduct,and researchfindingsare often
ambiguousand susceptibleto alternativeexplanations.Gergen suggests that social psychological
researchis primarilya historicalinquiry,documentingfluctuating,nonrepeatingsocial facts, thus
preventingan accumulationof knowledgeabout principlesof humanbehavioror interaction.

AMICUSCURIAE BRIEFS

5

often subject to the criticismof other researchers.In short, there is often dispute
about the validity of a particularstudy or even a series of studies. In Frye v.
United States (1923), a widely recognized standardfor the admissibilityof expert
testimony in court, the court held that the "scientific principleor discovery ...
must be sufficiently established to have gained scientific acceptance in the particularfield in which it belongs" (p. 1014).Recent changes in the Federal Rules of
Evidence (1984, Rule 702), which applies to federal courts and some state courts,
creates a standardthat is broaderthan Frye, allowing evidence from individuals
with specialized knowledge who can assist the trier of fact. This may eliminate
some of the problems that result from the Frye standard,because, as demonstrated by the debate contained in the AdversaryForum in this issue, scientific
acceptance of a particularconclusion drawn from a body of research can be
difficultto determine.Courtsfrequentlyrely on the statementsof a small number
of expert witnesses to assess consensus, often resultingin a situationin which two
experts reach different conclusions about whether a particularfinding is well
established. Rarelyare surveys of experts availablesuch as the one conducted by
Kassin, Ellsworth, and Smith (1989) on eyewitness research, but they can be
useful to the courts in determiningthe degree of consensus among researchers
about specific findingsand conclusions drawnfrom a body of research. Kassin et
al. are careful to note, however, that even with this informationthere are problems with using consensus as the sole criterion of admissibility. Nevertheless,
surveys of experts can provide importantdata that could be includedin briefs and
other court communications.
Of course, criticism and debate are at the heart of the scientific enterprise.
However, whereas social scientists see this as essential, the courts may interpret
it as an indicationof the weakness of the researchevidence. Consequently,judges
may be reluctant to base decisions, even in part, on social science research.
Judges may also decide against using research because, as Faigman(1989)points
out, "the concern arises that explicit reliance on social science research might
lead to the undercuttingof some legal rules if subsequent studies contradict the
earlier studies first used to establish the rule" (p. 1042).Faigmanmaintainsthere
are at least two reasons why this should not be a deterrentto the use of social
science research by the courts. First, such research is never the sole foundation
of a legal decision. Second, the fact that results may fluctuate over time does not
invalidatepriorresearch. Rather,it may simplyreflect real changes in individuals,
groups, or societal conditions. Indeed, some changes may be the direct result of
legal decisions that have affected the lives of individuals and consequently
changed their attitudes or behavior.
Monahanand Walker(1988; see also Walker& Monahan, 1988)offer a creative proposal that could effectively address concerns about the limits of social
science research. They propose that research shouldbe treatedas legal precedent
in much the same way that case law is regarded,subject to the normalreviews of
evidence law. Under their proposal, social scientists would have a limited role as
expert witnesses. Rather, they would "collaboratewith attorneys on the production of written briefs that would be the primary vehicle by which the parties
present empiricalresearch" (p. 471).
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The Advocacy versus Science Translation Role for Briefs
Briefs may also be analyzed along a continuum. At one end is a science
translation brief, which is intended to be an objective summaryof a body of
research. At the other end is an advocacy brief, which takes a position on some
legal or public policy issue. Whereas some briefs may attempt to be neutral in
their portrayalof a body of literature,many are more adversarialin nature. Indeed, some have arguedthat adversarialbriefs representthe predominantmethod
(see Tremper, 1987, for a review), a perception that may lead judges to regard
briefs as suspect. AP-LS has decided to follow the science translationmodel as
closely as possible. However, we would argue that all briefs must evaluate and
interpretresearch, so the distinctionbetween science translationand advocacy
briefs may often be blurred.Althoughit is a laudablegoal to strive to represent
objectively a body of research, even a science translationbrief will reflect the
knowledge, perspectives, and values of the brief writers.
Melton and Saks (1990) discuss the difficultiesin deciding how much interpretationversus summarya brief should contain:
Eitheralternativecan end up misleadinga reader,especiallya law reader,whichis what
the judges are when they read these kinds of briefs. The solution, we think, is in approachingthe writingwith an honest desire to sharewith the courts a faithfulpictureof
the availablepsychologicalknowledge,and to interpretthe researchonly to the extent
that doing so will clarifyits meaning.(p. 5)

To the extent, of course, that briefs departfrom a straightsummaryof the
researchand offer more evaluativeand interpretivecommentary,they may be the
targetof criticismfrom social scientists with differingviews of what conclusions
can be drawn from the research. We believe that this controversy is inevitable
because there will invariablybe some disagreementamong social scientists about
the conclusions to be drawnfrom a body of research. In preparingbriefs, social
scientists shouldstrive to ensure, at a minimum,thatbriefsrepresenta consensual
view of social scientists (i.e., what most experts in the field would conclude).
When appropriate,the briefs should make explicit alternativeinterpretationsand
opposingperspectives. This would be in keepingwith Bazelon's (1982)urgentcall
for disclosure by social scientists.
Death Penalty as a Case in Point
The use of amicus briefs, with specific referenceto the recent involvementof
APA in death penalty cases, is the topic debated in the AdversaryForum in this
issue. In Lockhartv. McCree(1986),the U.S. SupremeCourtrejectedthe validity
and legal relevance of the social science data presentedby expert evidence and in
an APA brief (see Bersoff, 1987;Elliott, 1990;Ellsworth, 1988). Both Ellsworth
(1988) and Thompson (1989) argue that the McCree decision is poorly reasoned
and unconvincingin its analysis of the social science evidence and of the legal
issue of jury impartiality,and they posit that the Justices did not understandhow
to use social science research. Thompson(1989)commentsthat the Justices may
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have assumed that a study is unworthyof considerationunless its design rules out
all possible confoundsand alternativeexplanations-an assumptionhe refersto as
"the myth of the definitive study." This incorrect assumption derives from a
failure to appreciatethe concept of convergent validity as it applies to an accumulationof studies (Ellsworth, 1991)and also to understandthe reality that most
changes in procedure(e.g., in medicalpractice)are based on much less definitive
results than those normally reported in highly regarded professional research
journals (Rosenthal, 1990).
Thompson goes on to argue that the Court's decision may have rested on
pragmaticratherthan legal foundations. Legal realists maintainthat this is often
the case. In McCree, the Court may have approachedthe issue of death qualification pragmatically,balancingthe perceived costs of eliminatingdeath qualification againstthe increasedprotectionof defendants'rightsthat would have been
afforded by the remedy sought in McCree. More cynically, as Thompson suggests, the decision may have been influencedby a desire to avoid reversingover
1,500 convictions of defendantstried by death-qualifiedjuries.
It is clear that other factors may influence a court decision and that briefs are
simply one potential contributionto the case at hand. There will be times when
social scientists will be frustratedthat they did not have greater influence, as in
the McCree case, and there will be other times when their influence will be more
substantial,as in the Craig case. Diamond (1989), for example, encourages psychologists to focus on the "trouble cases," cases where legal doctrine does not
provide the court with clear guidance. She maintainsthat the courts are likely to
be more receptive to social science research in these cases than in other cases
where legal doctrines are settled.
Of course, the fact that social scientists can be jubilant or disappointedover
the outcome of a case in which a brief has been filed implies that brief writers do
have a position and desire a particularoutcome. We do not quarrelwith this, but
simply believe that it supports our earlier point that a truly neutral brief is an
elusive if not an impossiblegoal. In some sense, the distinctionbetween a science
translationbrief and an advocacy brief is arbitrary,and it is often not readily
apparentwhere on the continuuma particularbrief belongs. It is possible to be
scientific without being neutral, to be objective yet form an opinion about the
implicationsof the research. If the data warranta particularconclusion, then it
may be reasonable for brief writers to advocate for a legal decision that would
reflect the knowledge gained from the research.
Pro Bono Amicus Brief Project
As noted earlier in this article, AP-LS has initiateda project in which it will
participatein writingamicus briefs in collaborationwith APA. The AP-LS Executive Committee appointed the Pro Bono Amicus Committee,3whose primary
3 The currentmembersof the committeeare GaryMeltonand MichaelSaks, co-chairs,Peter Blanck,
PatriciaFalk, ClarkStanton, and RichardWiener.
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responsibility is to identify topics for which briefs might be appropriate.4 Brief
topics can come to the attention of the committee from a variety of sources,
including U.S. Law Week reports on cases that have been granted certiorari,
newspaper stories, calls from division members or state associations, or calls from
APA or one of its directorates. Once a potential case is identified, the committee
consults with APA's Executive Office and the Public Interest Directorate. The
purpose of these consultations is to (a) obtain an initial measure of APA's interest
in the case, (b) start APA's review process through the Committee on Legal
Issues (CoLI), and (c) obtain suggestions from APA divisions regarding individuals with expertise who could become the principal brief writers. The decision to
write a brief requires the consent of a number of individuals and committees.
These include the Pro Bono Amicus Committee, the president of AP-LS and the
division's executive committee, and several groups and individuals within the
APA structure, including CoLI, the Board of Directors, and its in-house and
outside legal counsel. Finally, the committee must find individuals who are willing
to write the brief, usually within a tight time frame. As a practical matter, if any
of the above disapproves of a brief, it will not be written.
When all parties agree to prepare a brief, the task of writing it falls to the
substantive experts selected by the committee, along with one or two members of
the committee who participate in writing the brief. The committee wants the briefs
to be written in science translation style, providing a summary of empirical research or psychological theory that addresses an issue salient to a case to be heard
in state or federal appellate courts. The committee views briefs as a method of
providing knowledge and information to the courts.
One innovation established by the committee is what it refers to as plain label
briefs. The main difficulty in preparing briefs for cases that are already being
considered by a court is that time pressures limit the amount of consultation and
feedback before a brief is submitted. Typically, the writers only have a few weeks
to prepare the brief. One way of avoiding the problems created by this time
pressure is to draft some briefs before actual cases are being considered by the
court. Topics would be selected that are likely to come before one court or
another in the near future. Such briefs can be developed and reviewed by more
people than is feasible when a brief must be filed quickly. When an actual case
arises, the plain label brief would be updated and edited to fit the particular case.
When possible, Law and Human Behavior will publish plain label briefs, allowing
readers of the journal to have input into subsequent drafts of a brief before it is
actually filed in a particular case.

CONCLUDING

COMMENTS

We began this article with a comment that the number of social science briefs
has been steadily increasing. Nevertheless, the percentage of cases in which such
4

The materialfor this section was drawnfrom a reportpreparedby Gary Meltonand MichaelSaks
(1990),and from personalcommunicationsfrom the committeeco-chairs.
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briefs are filed is quite low. The vast majorityof state and federal court decisions
do not benefit from briefs even in cases in which social science research mightbe
highly relevant. AP-LS has initiated a brief submission process in an effort to
stimulate more communicationwith the courts. The involvement of AP-LS and
APA in amicus briefs has been debated by many scholars. Elliott (1991) raises two
fundamental questions about the practice of brief submission by APA. First, are
the data sufficiently valid to warrant their communication to the court?, and
second, can briefs communicate the research results adequately? Ellsworth (1991)
points out that the first issue must be addressed in the context of a specific case
and the answer will vary from case to case. Clearly, we need to be able to
recognize when the empirical evidence is weak or inconclusive so that we do not
submit briefs that overstate scientific authority, as Gardner, Scherer, and Tester
(1989) caution. The second issue relates to a more general question about the
value of briefs as a method of summarizing and communicating social science
research. It is important to keep these two issues separate in order to assess the
role of briefs generally as well as the adequacy of a specific brief. We are publishing the Craig brief as an example of a specific case involvement and we invite
readers to review it in the context of the questions and issues raised by several
authors in this issue of Law and Human Behavior. We also invite comments on
more general issues concerning the process of communicating social science research to the judiciary.
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